Legal Institution Ne Demek

Tom, yasal ya da değil onu yapacağını söylüyor. – Tom says he will, whether it`s legal or not. It is often said that international organizations are strange creatures. First, they are created by their Member States and are intended to exercise powers conferred on them by those Member States. On the other hand, they are also treated as if they had an existence of their own. The tension between these two poles shapes much of the law of international organizations or, as it is often called, international institutional law. For example, those who believe that organizations are merely vehicles for their member States are not inclined to recognize organizations as responsible for their own actions or to regard them as legitimate privileges and immunities; Those who accept the relative independence of international organizations will be more inclined to do so. In the field of international institutional law, they are generally referred to as organizations created by States and exercising governmental authority. Most observers agree that private entities are excluded from its scope, as are entities established within a single jurisdiction. Most observers also agree that institutional international law is considered a separate field from international law with its own journals, textbooks and academic chairs.

Whether the domain really recognizes the common rules that apply to all organizations is a matter of debate. International institutional law is characterized by a strong dose of functionalism. It is based on the idea that organizations are created to perform tasks or functions that their member States cannot perform alone or are sometimes reluctant to perform alone. By way of explanation, this proved to be very fruitful. Functionalism, for example, can help explain why organizations often need immunity from charges (prosecution would interfere with their functions) or why they have some powers but not others (because some powers may be considered necessary for their functioning). At the normative level, however, this functionalist approach has so far proved less useful, as it makes it difficult to control organizations. Because if they only do what is necessary for their functions, then strictly speaking, control becomes superfluous. They can exercise public authority, but they do so at the request of the Member States, so if something goes wrong, the Member States are to blame. Nevertheless, the political and moral debate about organizations suggests that organizations themselves may be guilty. When the United Nations (UN) did not intervene in the genocide in Rwanda, many blamed the UN itself, not its member states. As a result, since the late 1980s, a new approach to organizations has taken shape, focused on control and grouped under the label of «constitutionalism» to address a perceived lack of legitimacy.

The label may not be very precise, but it sums up the ambition well: the control of international organisations through (quasi-)constitutional doctrines, such as the assertion that international organisations are obliged to respect fundamental human rights. Arguably, fundamental concepts have not received the attention they deserve because of the dominance of functionalist theory over the legal framework of surrounding international organizations. As long as the functionalist path was followed, another theory was considered useless. It was one thing, for example, to claim that organizations had legal personality under international law, but it was not at all clear where that personality came from, what its consequences were or what the term «personality» itself meant. The same goes for the other key terms. There is widespread disagreement about how organizations acquire their powers, and in particular about the scope of the implied powers doctrine. For the same reason, there is widespread disagreement as to whether the privileges and immunities of international organizations (which protect them from the grip of domestic law) mean that domestic law has no role in the life of the organization. There was disagreement on what constituted an international organization and on the legal effects of the instruments adopted by international organizations, and there were still profound differences of opinion on how best to control them. Indeed, at a deeper level, there is a fundamental difference in the relationship between organizations and their member States. Are they simply vehicles for their members, or do they have a life of their own, perhaps symbolized in the work of the international civil service – bureaucracy – under the direction of a Director-General or Secretary-General? The law oscillates somewhat between the two ideas; International bureaucracy plays an important role, but so do the Member States. The validity of a legal system is independent of its effectiveness. A totally ineffective rule can be valid – as long as it is based on the recognition rule.

But to be a valid rule, the legal system of which the provision is part must be effective as a whole. According to Hart, any rule that matches the recognition rule is a valid legal rule. For example, if the rule of recognition was «what Professor X says is a law», then every rule that Professor X speaks of would be a valid rule of law. The Germans show great loyalty to the European Union and its institutions.