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What Is the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan

Under the mediation of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Government of the Sudan and SPLM/A signed a series of six agreements: 1.1. The parties agree that national ownership of the peace process, political will and continued dialogue are indispensable elements for lasting peace. They work together to respect and respect the ceasefire and draw on their own wisdom to contain and resolve the problems that arise; Let me summarize. Sudan is sort of like South Africa in the 1980s. It can maintain for some time the historical policy of the traditional leaders of the central part of the country; pitting opposing elements against each other or suppressing them militarily; it cannot defeat the insurgents in the Nuba Mountains, but it can contain them; it can live with near-anarchy in Darfur as long as it does not threaten the centre; And it can live economically on a combination of rents, humanitarian aid and a net of foreign investment to support the livelihoods of its supporters. Maybe she can do it for a while. But it can only do so at a high long-term cost. The country will not develop its economic potential, it will not attract significant foreign investment, it will not overcome international shame for its human rights violations, it will not experience peace or real prosperity. At some point, the system will no longer hold. The parties agree to engage in a comprehensive process of national reconciliation and healing throughout the country as part of the peacebuilding process. Its mechanisms and forms are developed by the Government of National Unity. He went on to list some of the achievements of the CPA. First, it has contributed to peace and stability in all parts of the Sudan, with the exception of Darfur.

With constitutional revisions across the country, each state in Sudan has its own constitution and functional system of government, including the introduction of a bill of fundamental rights and freedoms, although these have often not been fully implemented. A peace agreement with eastern Sudan was reached within the framework of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The APC also defined a new multicultural, multireligious, multilingual and multi-ethnic national identity for Sudan. Finally, with regard to the economy, the new currency, the Sudanese pound, is now in circulation and the growing fiscal responsibility has been transferred to the state level. As everyone here knows, I am sure that I have worked for more than two years on behalf of my Government to promote peace between Sudan and South Sudan and to fully implement the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. But I have been coming to Sudan for over thirty years. When I think of Sudan, I think not only of its current challenges and ongoing conflicts, but also of its long history of intellectual leadership in constitutional law, Islamic theology and practice, medicine, and so many other academic fields. I remember the welcoming atmosphere, tolerance and goodwill of the many Sudanese I know. In my view, these are still the fundamental elements of peace, democracy and prosperity in this country.

This is another reason why I am delighted to be here at the University of Khartoum, which is part of this tradition. A united opposition will also have to give up the goal of overthrowing the government by force. This is not a wise or even practical goal. Moreover, transformation by armed force has proven catastrophic in many countries, often leading to chaos or a new autocracy rather than democracy. Much better, is a negotiated. However, abandoning the goal of armed overthrow is more difficult for armed groups frustrated by false peace proposals or broken political promises. But here too, there are precedents for compromise. Nelson Mandela paid attention both to his constituents, who were engaged in armed struggle, and to the prospects for successful negotiations when confronted with De Klerk`s government`s demands to renounce «armed struggle» as a condition for negotiations.

Its response was to «suspend» the armed struggle as long as credible negotiations for democracy progressed. De Klerk was smart enough to accept this compromise. After a while, when the negotiations proved fruitful, the armed struggle became irrelevant. It will be more difficult to achieve in Sudan, but that is the direction in which the negotiations should go. On 11 October 2007, SPLM withdrew from the Government of National Accord (GoNU), accusing the central Government of violating the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In particular, the SPLM notes that the Khartoum-based government, dominated by the National Congress Party, has not withdrawn more than 15,000 troops from the southern oil fields and has not implemented the Abyei protocol. The SPLM said it would not resume the war, while analysts noted that the deal had been falling apart for some time, particularly due to international attention to the conflict in neighboring Darfur. [2] The Abyei region, a sensitive area near the historic border between North and South Sudan, has been given special administrative status.

Abyei is defined in the agreement as a «bridge between north and south» and consists of the territory of nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms that were moved from south to north in 1905 when Sudan was under Anglo-Egyptian rule. Under the rules of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Abyei should be governed by its own elected Executive Council.

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